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Ski Taxi: Joint Bidding in Procurement as Price-Fixing? 
Albert Sanchez-Graells* 
Case E-3/16 Ski Taxi SA, Follo Taxi SA og Ski Follo Taxidrift AS v Staten v/Konkurransetilsynet 22 
December 2016 
Since joint bidding in public procurement procedures involves price-fixing between the members of 
the bidding consortium, the assessment of whether it reveals a sufficient degree of harm to 
competition only requires limited consideration of its economic and legal context, which may be 
restricted to what is strictly necessary to establish the existence of a restriction of competition by 
object. 
I Legal context 
This comment concerns an EFTA Court Judgment based on the competition provisions of the EEA 
Agreement. Thus, it is worth noting that Article 53 EEA prohibits anticompetitive practices in roughly 
the same terms as Article 101 TFEU. In principle, it can be assumed that both provisions are 
substantially equivalent. Article 53(1) EEA establishes a prohibition of all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade, and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition. It also includes an indicative list of different types of anticompetitive practices, such as 
price fixing or market sharing. Article 53(3) EEA provides an exemption for efficiency-generating 
anticompetitive practices that allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits. This can cover 
both quantitative and qualitative efficiencies, such as those derived from practices that allow for 
cost reductions or quality improvements—eg as the result of joint development of a new technology 
by two competing undertakings. Anticompetitive practices that breach of Article 53(1) EEA (or Art 
101(1) TFEU) can thus be exempted under Article 53(3) EEA (or Art 101(3) TFEU), and this requires a 
two-stage analysis of the effects of the practice [see the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Guidelines on 
the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement [2007] OJ C208/1; see also the European 
Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] C101/97].  
Furthermore, when interpreting the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Court is bound to act under the 
principle of homogeneity of EU and EEA law [Art 6 EEA] and pay due account to the principles laid 
down by the relevant rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) [Art 3(2) of the 
EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement]. In practice, the EFTA Court follows closely the case law of 
the CJEU, and this contributes to further substantive compatibility between the competition rules in 
the EEA Agreement and the TFEU. However, there is no written obligation for the CJEU to take into 
consideration the jurisprudence of the EFTA Court. If the EFTA Court interpreted Article 53 EEA in a 
manner that deviated from the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 101 TFEU, this could be corrected in 
subsequent Judgments of the CJEU. Therefore, the extent to which the Ski Taxi Judgment is relevant 
under EU competition law will depend on future decisions of the CJEU. Given the state of flux of the 
jurisprudence concerning the analysis of anticompetitive agreements by object, it is difficult to 
predict with much certainty whether the CJEU will endorse the approach of the EFTA Court to the 
treatment of joint bidding as price-fixing. 
II Facts 
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Ski Taxi and Follo Taxi are two taxi companies active in the vicinity of the city of Oslo. In 2001, they 
established a joint management company (SFD), which they own 50/50 and have tasked with certain 
administrative activities of common interest. Remarkably, SFD is also entrusted with the submission 
of joint bids in tender procedures. Where SFD is successful, Ski Taxi and Follo Taxi execute the 
contract as SFD’s subcontractors. An SFD Shareholders’ Agreement of 2007 explicitly recognises that 
the arrangements between Ski Taxi and Follo Taxi will result in “less competition between them in 
the market than previously. This applies to both pric[ing] policy in tenders and other strategic 
measures in relation to the market”. 
In 2010, Oslo University Hospital (OUH) ran a public procurement tender for the award of framework 
agreements for the provision of patient transport services. The tender procedure was divided in nine 
geographical lots. For two of those lots, SFD submitted the only tender received by OUH, which 
decided to cancel the procedure for those two lots. After raising the issue of the lack of competition 
between Ski Taxi and Follo Taxi with the Norwegian Competition Authority, OUH launched a new 
tender procedure, where it redesigned the geographical coverage and divided the framework 
agreements in five areas instead of two. SFD submitted a joint bid for all five lots, as did two 
competing taxi companies. OUH eventually entered framework agreements with all three 
companies, and assigned SFD second priority in all five areas. 
Despite the outcome of the second tender, the Norwegian Competition Authority decided to 
investigate SFD, Ski Taxi and Follo Taxi for the joint bidding strategy and eventually imposed 
sanctions. This was justified on the basis that Ski Taxi and Follo Taxi would have been able to submit 
separate tenders in both tender procedures, and that cooperation for the submission of the joint 
bids had as its object a restriction of competition contrary to Section 10 of the Norwegian 
Competition Act—which is equivalent to Article 53 EEA (and Art 101 TFEU).  
After reversal on judicial review by the Follo District Court and reinstatement on appeal by the 
Borgarting Court of Appeal, the case made it to the Supreme Court of Norway. The latter requested 
the EFTA Court to clarify the legal test for a determination of whether an agreement between 
undertakings has a competition-restricting object. And, more precisely, to clarify what legal criteria 
must be emphasised when considering whether cooperation that takes the form of a joint tender 
through a joint venture, and where the two undertakings are to be subcontractors to the joint 
venture, should be deemed to constitute an infringement by object of Article 53 EEA. 
In order to answer the more general question, the EFTA Court adhered to relevant CJEU case law on 
the delineation of anticompetitive practices by object (mainly, CB v Commission, C-67/13 P, 
EU:C:2014:2204). In relation to the more specific assessment of joint bidding in procurement as a 
possible anticompetitive agreement by object, the EFTA Court took the position that joint bidding 
implied price-fixing because “by submitting joint bids … [the undertakings] agreed on the price 
offered to the contracting authority” (para 92). This led to the further clarification that “in order to 
determine whether the submission of joint bids through a joint management company reveals a 
sufficient degree of harm [such] that it may be considered a restriction of competition by object, 
regard must be had to the substance of the cooperation, its objectives and the economic and legal 
context of which it forms part. The parties’ intention may also be taken into account, although this is 
not a necessary factor” (para 101). “Moreover, since the submission of joint bids involves price-fixing, 
which is expressly prohibited by Article 53(1) EEA, consideration of the economic and legal context 
may be limited to what is strictly necessary in order to establish the existence of a restriction of 
competition by object. However, such an assessment needs to take into account, albeit in an 
abridged manner, whether the parties to an agreement are actual or potential competitors and 
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whether the joint setting of the price offered to the contracting authority constitutes an ancillary 
restraint” of their broader joint venture cooperation (para 102). 
III Analysis 
This analysis is limited to the treatment of joint bidding as a potential price-fixing anticompetitive 
agreement by object. In abstract terms and taken to its logical extreme, equating joint bidding to 
illegal price-fixing could be tantamount to setting a blanket a priori prohibition of joint tendering in 
public procurement as an infringement of Article 53(1) EEA—and, potentially, Article 101(1) TFEU—
even between non-competing undertakings (ie undertakings that can only be notionally considered 
as potential competitors under possibly thin or extremely abridged counterfactual scenarios). Such 
approach would tend to proscribe joint tendering as such because tenders for public contracts need 
to include an element of price, except in limited fixed-price tenders based on quality competition 
only [see Art 67(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement [2014] OJ L94/65]. Its 
consideration as price-fixing would prevent the exemption of joint bidding under the de minimis 
rules and any potentially applicable block exemption regulations, and restrict its possibilities to an 
efficiency-based justification under Article 53(3) EEA (and Art 101(3) TFEU). This would go beyond 
the position advanced by even the strictest of commentators to date, which have argued for tests 
based on the effects of joint bidding in terms of loss of potential competition for the contract, rather 
than attempting to proscribe joint bidding as an almost absolute violation of Article 101(1) TFEU [for 
in-depth discussion, see Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Joint bidding and object restrictions of 
competition: The EFTA Court’s take in the “Taxi case”’ (2017) European Competition and Regulatory 
Law Review, forthcoming].  
In Ski Taxi, the EFTA Court seems to aim to distance itself from such extreme position by requiring 
that the assessment of the price-fixing element of joint bidding includes an abridged evaluation of 
the competitive relationship between the joint bidders in the context of their broader collaboration. 
However, the EFTA Court is not very clear in the weight it gives to the possibility in the case at hand 
for each bidder to have tendered independently (see paras 97-98), and the analysis of joint bidding 
as price-fixing is not restricted to a requirement of actual competition. The test also seems rather 
peculiar to the circumstances of the case, where the bidders had established a joint venture, which 
allows for a broader assessment. Generally, this seems difficult to operationalise in one-off 
collaborations for specific public contracts—except if one was willing to accept the setting of the bid 
price as an ancillary restraint of the one-off joint tendering agreement itself, which would create 
illogical circularity in the treatment of joint bidding as a price-fixing violation in the first place. 
Moreover, in requiring engaging in an analysis of the joint tendering agreement to demonstrate that 
it reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition beyond establishing the mere possibility that it 
could have that effect, the EFTA Court follows the CJEU’s steps in blurring the limits of the 
substantive assessment of infringements of competition law by object and by effect [see Maxima 
Latvija, C-345/14, EU:C:2015:784]. This is due to create difficult boundary issues in the assessment of 
the discharge of the burden of proof by competition authorities, and comes to erode the distinction 
between object and effect infringements in practical terms. 
Further, a broad approach to the substantive assessment of the competitive relationship of the joint 
bidders for the purposes of the prohibition of Articles 53(1) EEA and 101(1) TFEU—ie based on the 
position that, if they are at least potential competitors, joint bidding is deemed illegal price fixing—
can create additional problems of interaction with the substantive test for the efficiency based 
exemption under Articles 53(3) EEA and 101(3) TFEU. Where the joint bidders are not actual 
competitors, their agreement to tender jointly can still be caught by Article 53(1) EEA on the basis 
that they could nonetheless have decided to compete for the contract eg by entering into 
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independent agreements with third parties. Similarly, a joint bidding agreement may not be 
exempted under Article 53(3) EEA if the undertakings could have generated the same efficiencies 
through less restrictive means, which some commentators have understood to include an 
assessment of potential alternative agreements with third parties as options less restrictive of 
competition [see Cyril Ritter, ‘Joint Tendering Under EU Competition Law’ (2017) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909572> accessed 3 May 2017]. However, this does not seem 
appropriate for the assessment of joint tenders by potential competitors. Given that the condition of 
potential competitors of the joint bidders would have formed part of the assessment of the 
prohibition—either as a potential infringement by object (due to the abridged analysis) or by effect 
(under a fuller analysis)—it seems inappropriate to take it into consideration again when assessing 
the exemption. Doing otherwise would create a double whammy resulting from a formal 
understanding of different implications of potential competition for the purposes of determining the 
anticompetitive nature of an agreement, as well as for the purposes of assessing the existence of 
less restrictive alternatives for the generation of the efficiencies claimed to derive from the joint 
tender – quod non. 
IV Practical Significance 
It seems that the Ski Taxi Judgment points in the direction of increasingly subjecting joint bidding to 
stricter and stricter competition assessments—and, potentially, to a very strict one if considered 
anticompetitive by object even between potential competitors—which will ultimately make the 
viability of this extended business practice hinge on the exemptability of joint tendering 
arrangements on the basis of Articles 53(3) EEA and 101(3) TFEU. This creates a situation where joint 
bidders need to take anticipatory measures to be able to prove that there are specific and 
measurable efficiencies derived from the joint bidding strategy and that they are passed on to the 
public buyer—either in the form of facilitating bids that could otherwise not be submitted, or as 
substantially superior bids than those that the joint bidders could have submitted separately [see A 
Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2nd edn, Hart 2015) 339]. This is 
important beyond the specific bid, as infringements of competition law are now an explicit cause for 
exclusion from public procurement opportunities [see Art 57(4)(d) and (c) of Directive 2014/24/EU, 
in relation with Generali-Providencia Biztosító, C-470/13, EU:C:2014:2469]. 
